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The Constitutionality of Compulsory
Identification Procedures on Less Than
Probable Cause: Reassessing the Davis
Dictum.
I. Introduction
When a crime is committed, the perpetrator often leaves some
little part of himself behind. For example, police often discover
fingerprints, hair specimens or blood samples. In other cases, a wit-
ness or victim is able to provide a physical description or make a
voice identification. These clues can aid tremendously in identifying
the culprit if they can be matched up with comparative samples
taken from suspects.' However, when the person sought to be tested
is unwilling to cooperate, the use of this law enforcement technique
potentially conflicts with his personal rights.2
While compulsory participation in identification tests does not
violate an individual's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation,3 insuring his availability by force does constitute a seizure of
the person,4 which is protected by the fourth amendment. 5 To resolve
1. Comment, Detention for Taking Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause, 14
ARIZ. L. REV. 132 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Detention]; Note, Detention to
Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 712 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Detention].
Other types of physical evidence which have been used to help solve crimes include palm
prints, foot prints, body measurements, handwriting samples, urine samples, saliva samples,
photographs, handprinting, and material removed from beneath fingernails.
2. An individual's rights are not violated when he voluntarily submits to the taking of
evidence. However, "consent may not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied
threat or covert force." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (dictum), cited
in Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 445 n.103
(1974).
3. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1965) (handwriting samples do not
violate privilege), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood samples) do not violate
privilege). United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1972) (voice samples do not violate privi-
lege). But see Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980) (order requiring handwriting sam-
ple violated state privilege against self incrimination).
Generally the distinction made is that evidence of a communicative or testimonial nature
is protected while mere physical evidence is not. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252
(1910).
4. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (detention for fingerprinting
and questioning). But see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1968) (grand jury subpoena
to give voice exemplar not fourth amendment seizure), United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19
the conflict between the police need and the individual's rights, a
court must determine at what point a suspect is sufficiently con-
nected to the commission of a crime that the public interest in solv-
ing that crime justifies subjecting him to the procedure against his
will. Courts uniformly have held that probable cause, that is, evi-
dence "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
[suspect] . . . had committed or was committing an offense,"' is suf-
ficient evidence to compel participation.7 Not surprisingly, the need
for the procedures is sometimes greatest when the police do not have
probable cause. For example, police may be certain that one member
of a small group of persons committed a murder, (perhaps because
of restrictive access to the scene), but do not have probable cause to
believe that any particular person did the act.8 When the police do
not have probable cause, the constitutionality of compulsory identifi-
cation procedures is uncertain.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the issue,9 the Court suggested by way of dictum,10 in Davis
v. Mississippi," that a brief detention for fingerprinting might be
(1973) (grand jury subpoena to give handwriting sample not fourth amendment seizure).
5. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
U.S. Co sT. amend. IV.
Compelling a suspect to participate in identification procedures requires two separate
state actions. The first is forcing the person to appear at the place where the evidence will be
taken. This is a seizure of the person which implicates the fourth amendment. See Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). The second action is the searching for and then seizing of
the evidence from the individual. The Supreme Court has generally held this type of procedure
not to constitute a search. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
6. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). For further discussion of the requirement of
probable cause see infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood samples); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup): Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)
(handwriting specimens). Since probable cause is the standard required for the extensive intru-
sion of a full arrest, it is deemed afortiori sufficient to justify the lesser intrusion of detention
for the taking of physical evidence. See In re Armed Robbery, 99 Wash. 2d 106, 659 P.2d
1092 (1983).
8. For an account of two Colorado cases in which the need arose see Carrington,
Speaking for the Police, 61 J. CRIM. LAW CRIM. & POL. Sci. 244, 257 (1970).
It is difficult to determine precisely how often the need for identification procedures arises
when there is no probable cause to arrest. A Michigan legislative committee considering pro-
posed legislation covering the area concluded that "no reliable estimate could be obtained as to
how frequently such situations arise." See Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and
Seizures: The Michigan Proposals, 73 MICH. L. REV. 222, 239 (1974).
9. The Court recently denied certiorari in State v. Hall, 93 N.J. 552, 461 A.2d 1155
(1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3440 (12/5/83).
10. 394 U.S. 721 (1967).
1I. The Court explicitly stated that it did not decide the question of whether identifica-
tion procedures could be performed on less than probable cause, noting: "We have no occasion
in this case . . . to determine whether the requirements of the fourth amendment could be met
by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investiga-
squared with the requirements of the fourth amendment, under nar-
rowly defined circumstances, even in the absence of traditional prob-
able cause.12
Relying heavily upon this dictum, several lower courts have up-
held identification procedures on less than probable cause. 3 Many of
these decisions authorize procedures not mentioned in Davis."'
Moreover, since Davis, the Supreme Court has handed down several
important fourth amendment decisions that have shaped and defined
the constitutional theory upon which the Davis dictum is based, 5
perhaps weakening the foundation on which the state compulsory
identification schemes rest. This comment examines how state and
lower federal courts have analyzed forced identification procedures
on less than probable cause and reexamines the constitutional issue
in light of recent Supreme Court decisions.
II. Balancing as a Theory of Constitutionality
Prior to 1967, all searches and seizures not based on probable
cause were unconstitutional.'" The Supreme Court did not define the
standard in terms of precise mathematical probabilities; 7 rather, it
viewed probable cause as a single, objective' standard to be uni-
tion, the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable cause to arrest." Id. at 727.
Both courts and commentators have consistently referred to the court's pronouncements as
dicta. See, e.g., In re Armed Robbery, 99 Wash. 2d 106, 109, 659 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1983); 3
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.6, at 153
(1978).
12. Davis, 394 U.S. at 727 (1967).
13. For a discussion of these cases see infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
14. The Davis decision, spoke exclusively in terms of detentions for fingerprinting, em-
phasizing the unique attributes of that procedure. State courts, however, have authorized a
variety of identification procedures beyond fingerprinting such as lineups, handwriting samples,
photographing, hair samples and blood samples. For a discussion of these cases see infra notes
58-76 and accompanying text.
15. The suggestion in Davis that identification procedures could be compelled on less
than probable cause is based on a theory of constitutional analysis introduced in the cases of
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The
Court decided Davis in 1969, without the benefit of decisions examining either precedent.
16. For a definition of probable cause, see supra note 7 and accompanying text. The
purpose of the requirement is well stated by Justice Rutledge in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949):
These long prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unrea-
sonable interferences with privacy and unfounded charges of crime. They also
seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection....
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be
to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers whim or caprice.
17. Rather than expressing probable cause by way of mathematical percentages, the
Court has relied on the familiar terminology of reasonable belief. In describing the amount of
suspicion necessary the court has stated: "[W]e deal with probabilities .... They are factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians act." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959). Despite the importance
of the probable cause standard, few Supreme Court decisions discuss the meaning of the con-
cept. For a detailed discussion of various definitions of probable cause see Comment, The
Erosion of Probable Cause, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 212 (1982).
18. The Supreme Court has held that subjective good faith on the part of the officer is
formly applied in all cases. Thus, differences in the severity of the
particular intrusion or the importance of the government interest did
not figure into the constitutional calculus.1 9
Two Supreme Court cases decided in 1967 and 1968 modified
this approach by taking these factors into account. In Camara v.
Municipal Court20 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a San
Francisco ordinance which authorized city employees to make health
and safety inspections of all personal residences without a warrant
and without probable cause to believe that a specific violation ex-
isted. " The Court refused to prohibit the inspections on constitu-
tional grounds merely because there was no particularized showing
of probable cause. To comply with the requirements of the fourth
amendment, the court held, the searches need only be reasonable, 2
and to determine reasonableness, the Court looked to "the need to
search [balanced] against the invasion which the search entails.12 3
In the particular case before it, the Court characterized the inspec-
tions as a "relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy."
It also observed that the procedure had "a long history of judicial
and public acceptance" and that they "were not personal in nature
nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime."'2 The Court also
thought the goal of preventing health epidemics and fires was signifi-
cant.25 After balancing the equities, the Court concluded that spe-
cific knowledge of the conditions of a particular residence was not a
constitutional prerequisite and permitted area wide searches under a
reasonable legislative or administrative scheme.2"
not sufficient. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). Accord Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959) (prudent man); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (man of reasonable caution). See
generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 3.2, at 459-61.
19. Several commentators argue that while the Supreme Court describes probable
cause as a fixed standard, the Court actually considers the nature of the offense and the degree
of intrusiveness when determining the level of evidence it requires. See, e.g., Bacigal, The
Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763,
773; 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, at § 3.2.
20. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
21. The ordinance provided that:
[A]uthorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may
be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of
proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building,
structure or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the
Municipal Code.
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HOUSING CODE § 503.
22. 387 U.S. at 534.
23. Id. at 536-37.
24. Id. at 537.
25. In assessing the government's need for area wide inspections, the Court gave weight
to the official's contention that no other technique would be effective in policing violations
because many substandard conditions were not observable from the outside of the building.
See id. 387 U.S. at 535-36.
26. The Court did not describe in detail what would constitute an acceptable scheme.
It did mention these factors: the nature of the building, the passage of time, and the conditions
of the entire area. Id. at 538.
Terry v. Ohio,27 decided the following term, applied the same
balancing test in the context of criminal law. In Terry, a police of-
ficer who had confronted a criminal suspect, briefly searched the
man's outer clothing because he believed that the suspect was carry-
ing a weapon.28 Denying Terry's motion to suppress, the Court held
that the validity of the police conduct was to be judged by its reason-
ableness, determined by balancing the government interest against
the severity of the personal intrusion. 2' The Court explained that
while probable cause represented the appropriate balance in the ordi-
nary search or seizure case, the limited nature of the brief frisk and
the strong public interest in police safety merited a new balancing."0
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the officer was justified in
making the frisk upon his reasonable belief3 1 that the suspect was
armed and dangerous in spite of the absence of traditional probable
cause.
32
Since identification procedures based upon less than probable
cause are per se unreasonable under the traditional approach, their
validity when probable cause does not exist depends on the threshold
question of whether the balancing test utilized in Camara and Terry
is applicable and, assuming that a balancing test is applied, whether
the intrusion is slight enough and the government interest strong
enough to justify a departure from probable cause. The Supreme
Court has not decided either of these questions, but the Court has
addressed the issues in dictum in Davis v. Mississippi."3 Because of
the lack of authoritative precedent, the lower courts naturally have
relied on the Court's pronouncements in Davis v. Mississippi.4
In Davis, the police briefly detained a suspect in a rape investi-
gation at a police station and routinely questioned and fingerprinted
him. Authorities later admitted that at the time of the detainment,
the police did not have sufficient grounds to arrest Davis35 but ar-
gued that their actions nevertheless were permissible based on a bal-
27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28. Prior to the confrontation, the officer had closely observed Terry and another man.
Both Terry and the man had repeatedly walked by a certain store, peering into the store
window each time they passed. The officer suspected that the men were "casing" the store,
planning to hold it up. Id. at 5-7.
29. Id. at 20-21.
30. Id. at 26-27.
31. While the Court contemplated a standard of suspicion less rigorous than traditional
probable cause, the Court noted that the officer's suspicion had to be based on specific and
articulable facts rather than meie subjective hunches. Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 30.
33. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
34. See supra note 11.
35. The police had few clues: Fingerprints found at the scene and the victim's general
description that her assailant was a Negro youth. The police fingerprinted and questioned Da-
vis solely because he fit the general description.
ancing theory."6 In review of the case the Supreme Court appeared
to accept this justification, noting that "[d]etentions for fingerprint-
ing may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal secur-
ity than other types of searches and seizures."'37 The Court based
this observation on what it termed the unique attributes of the
fingerprinting process described as follows:
Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual's
private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.
Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass
an individual, since the police need only one set of each person's
prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable
and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identification or
confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper
lineup and the third degree. Finally, because there is no danger
of destruction of fingerprints, the limited detention need not
come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time.
38
Given the special features of fingerprinting, detentions for the proce-
dure under "narrowly defined circumstances" might be found to
comply with the fourth amendment upon a showing of less than
probable cause.39 However, the Court specifically declined to decide
the issue in Davis v. Mississippi because the officials had made no
attempt to minimize the offensiveness of the detention. The facts
showed that the police had fingerprinted Davis twice, interrogated
him at the police station, and had not obtained a warrant.
But the Davis decision offers only limited aid in answering the
two questions posed above. By suggesting that it was open to al-
lowing some detentions on less than probable cause, the Court im-
plied that a balancing approach might be applicable. Certainly, Da-
vis left unclear whether any other identification procedures would
qualify for the lower standard. Moreover, even when fingerprinting is
the identification procedure at issue, Davis does not answer when the
"narrowly defined circumstances" arise to trigger application of the
balancing test. The Court merely indicated that the combination of
no warrant, questioning, and duplicate fingerprinting was too intru-
sive under the facts of the particular case. Despite these limita-
36. The state also argued that the detention was not a seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment because it occurred during the investigatory rather than accusatory
stage. The Court soundly rejected this argument, explaining: "Nothing is more clear than that
the fourth amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of
our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or investigatory detentions." Davis,
394 U.S. at 726, 727. Accord Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (brief patdown for weap-
ons subject to fourth amendment even though not full search).
37. Id. at 727.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Court cited Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
tions, 40 the Davis dictum has had a substantial impact on how courts
and legislators have viewed compulsory identification procedures.
III. Impact of Davis v. Mississippi
A. Statutes and Court Rules
Many state officials regarded the Davis dictum as an invitation
to act."' By 1973, six jurisdictions had passed legislation42  or
adopted court rules 43 that authorized magistrates4" to order criminal
suspects to participate45 in identification procedures on less than
probable cause. A seventh state adopted a similar rule in 1979.4
Significantly, these provisions are not limited to fingerprinting. Most
of the states authorize detention for all of the following: taking pho-
tographs; obtaining specimens of blood, hair, urine, and saliva; tak-
ing handwriting samples, voice samples, fingerprints, palm prints,
foot prints, and other body measurements; and using lineups. 
7
The state schemes vary on what level of suspicion is required to
40. See Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A
Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1011,
1041 (1973), in which the author argues that the Court's cryptic dictum in Davis must be read
narrowly.
41. See generally, 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 9.6, at 153, 154; Note, Detention
supra note 1, at 714. Prior to Davis, there were no statutes or court rules which authorized
identification procedures on less than probable cause. See Comment, Detention supra note 1,
at 144-46.
42. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3905 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 19-625 (1979); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-3301 - 29-3307 (1979); N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-271 - 15A-282 (1983); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-8-1 - 77-8-4 (1982). For law review articles discussing particular statutes see
Comment, Detention note I (Arizona) and Comment, Nontestimonial Identification Orders
Without Probable Cause, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 387 (1976) (North Carolina).
43. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1.
44. Every state measure provides that the identification order be issued by a judicial
officer. In Davis the Court suggested that the feature would be required in every case "because
there is no danger of destruction of fingerprints [and] the limited detention need not come
unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time. For this same reason, the general requirement that
the authorization of a judicial officer be obtained in advance of detention would seem not to
admit of any exception in the fingerprinting context." Davis, 394 U.S. at 727. But see Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Davis in which he argues that there might be emergency situations
where no warrant would be required. Id. at 728-729 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45. The state schemes differ as to how the identification orders are carried out. In three
states the court issues an order directly to the suspect to appear upon his own initiative at a
designated time and place. (Arizona, Idaho, North Carolina). In Colorado, the order is di-
rected to a police officer who is authorized to take the person into custody for performance of
the procedures. A third group of states either provides for both types (Nebraska) or does not
specify (Alaska, Utah).
46. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(1)-16(c)(3).
47. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and North Carolina permit all of the procedures men-
tioned in the text. Alaska permits all of the procedures mentioned but the following: palm
prints, foot prints, other body measurements, urine samples and saliva samples. Utah permits
only lineups. In addition, the following procedures are available in the indicated states: mate-
rial from under fingernails, physical or medical examination, trying on clothing (Alaska, Colo-
rado); handprinting (Nebraska, Utah). Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska and North Carolina al-
low for the possibility of procedures not specifically listed.
justify the detention. Alaska's, the strictest standard, requires proba-
ble cause to believe that an offense was committed by one person of
a narrow focal group that includes the subject person."8 Four states
require only reasonable grounds to suspect that the person commit-
ted an offense.4 9 Finally, two states authorize the procedures upon a
mere showing that the evidence might contribute to the identification
of an individual who committed an offense. 0
The American Law Institute," the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform Law,52 and the American Bar Associa-
tion,53 have also proposed schemes for administering identification
tests on less than probable cause. On the federal level, a proposed
Senate bill54 granted district court judges the authority to order indi-
viduals to appear before a magistrate for the taking of physical evi-
dence upon a showing that the evidence might help identify a person
who committed a criminal offense.5 Also, the Advisory Committee
on Criminal Rules drafted Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 41.1, which likewise would provide for compulsory identifica-
tion orders on less than probable cause.5  Neither the senate bill nor
48. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(1)-(c)(3).
49. The precise language varies from state to state: "Reasonable grounds, not amount-
ing to probable cause to arrest, to suspect the person committed the offense." (Colorado);
"Reasonable grounds, which may or may not amount to probable cause to believe that the
identified person committed the offense." (Idaho); "Reasonable grounds to suspect that the
person named or described in the affidavit committed the offense." (North Carolina); "There is
reason to believe the suspect committed [the offense] .. " (Utah).
50. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3905 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3301 - 29-3307
(1979).
51. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE art. 170 (1975). The Model
Code provides that an authorized judicial officer may order an individual to appear for a wide
range of identification procedures upon evidence showing reasonable grounds to suspect that
the individual committed the offense and it is reasonable in view of the seriousness of the
offense to subject him to the specific identification procedure.
At least one state court has modeled its judicially created scheme upon the provisions of
the Model Code. See Hall v. New Jersey, 93 N.J. 552, 461 A.2d 1155 (1983).
52. UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 436 (1974). The Uniform Rule is similar to the Model Code in
that it authorizes a court to order participation in a large variety of identification procedures.
However, the Uniform Rule is more strict. The Uniform Rule requires that the judicial officer
only issue an order upon a finding of probable cause to believe that an offense has been com-
mitted by one or more of several persons comprising a narrow focal group that includes the
subject person.
53. STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, § 3.1
(1970). The A.B.A. standard provides that a judicial officer may require an accused to partici-
pate in several different types of evidence gathering techniques regardless of whether he has
been formally charged. The standards, however, do not specify the level of suspicion required
to justify the order. They merely state that the order shall be subject to constitutional limita-
tions. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c) was apparently modeled after the A.B.A. standards. See
Liston v. State, 658 P.2d 1347 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
54. S. 2997, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
55. For the full text of the bill which authorizes a variety of identification procedures,
see MODEL CODE supra note 51, Appendix VIII-G. Arizona's identification statute was appar-
ently modeled upon the Senate bill. See, Comment Detention supra note 1, at 144-45.
56. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FED. R. CRIM. P. (Pre. Draft 1971), reprinted in
52 F.R.D. 409 (1971). The proposed rule authorizes several identification procedures upon
reasonable grounds not amounting to probable cause to suspect that the individual committed
the proposed court rule has been adopted.57
B. Judicial Reaction
The state provisions have produced little litigation. Only two
schemes have faced constitutional challenge; in each case the validity
of the provision was upheld. 8 In State v. Grijalva,59 Arizona author-
ities sought an order under the state scheme to fingerprint, photo-
graph, and take hair samples from a rape suspect. The suspect chal-
lenged the statute because it failed to require probable cause.
Applying a Camara/Terry balancing test, 0 the court rejected this
challenge. It found the public interest sufficiently great because the
statute only authorized orders when the crime under investigation
was an offense punishable by more than one year" and when the
evidence sought was not otherwise available.62 It also thought the
intrusion upon the test subject was slight.6 3
In People v. Madson,8 ' the Colorado Supreme Court upheld its
state's court rule providing for compulsory identification. In that
case the state high court rejected the constitutional argument of a
murder suspect who, without a showing of probable cause, was or-
dered to give a handwriting sample. The court thought the rule was
within the Terry exception to the probable cause requirement be-
cause under the rule, the police could only coerce nontestimonial evi-
the offense. For a discussion of the proposed rule see Note, Detention supra note 1; Comment,
Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.1, 56 MINN. L. REV. 667 (1972).
57. United States v. Holland, 552 F.2d 667, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1977), withdrawn 565
F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1977). The Senate bill did not survive committee. id. at 673. The Proposed
Rule was rejected by the Judicial Conference in part because "[t]he committees and the con-
ference should have the benefit of more experience with such procedure in the states and in the
District of Columbia and of judicial consideration of the constitutional question involved." Id.
at 674.
58. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3905 (1978); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1. In State v.
Swayze, 197 Neb. 149, 247 N.W.2d 440 (1976), a woman suspected of attempting to murder
her child challenged a court order which directed her to submit to a blood sample. She main-
tained that the Nebraska statute which authorized the order was unconstitutional. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court held that the statute as applied was constitutional. The court, however,
seemed to have assumed the existence of probable cause. Id. at 247, N.W.2d at 447.
59. 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873 (1975).
60. Accord, Long v. Garrett, 22 Ariz. App. 397, 527 P.2d 1240 (1974) (constitutional
challenge to Arizona statute rejected; woman suspected of cashing stolen check ordered to
submit handwriting sample).
61. North Carolina, Colorado and Idaho have similar provisions that restrict the use of
orders to cases in which the investigated offense is punishable by at least on year in prison or
constitutes a felony. The restriction seeks to ensure that the government interest in solving the
crime is sufficiently great to justify a departure from probable cause.
62. The Alaska and Idaho schemes also include this feature. The restriction is thought
to serve two purposes: 1) reduce the number of occasions that law enforcement officials ap-
proach the court for orders, and 2) limit the use of orders for harassment purposes. See
MODEL CODE, supra note 51, at 105.
63. The Court noted that photographs and fingerprints involved none of the probing
Davis found objectionable and that the clipping of hairs was only the slightest intrusion.
64. 638 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1981).
dence;65 the evidence they sought had to be of material aid in solving
the crime;66 and they had to obtain a judicial warrant in advance.
67
Law enforcement officers have petitioned courts for like orders
in states where no court rule or statute has been adopted. In these
states, the petitioned court first must decide whether it possesses the
power to issue identification orders on less than probable cause with-
out explicit authorization. A number of courts have refused to issue
orders on the theory that they lack the power.6 8 Other courts have
found the power in either a grant of general jurisdiction, 9 constitu-
tional authority over searches and seizures,7 0 or implicit statutory
authority.71
Courts which have no authority for forced identification by stat-
ute or by court rule have split on the constitutional issue. The lead-
ing case to approve the procedures based on less than probable cause
is Wise v. Murphy,7 2 decided by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in 1970. In Wise, police sought an order to compel a rape
suspect to participate in a lineup. The victim of the rape had picked
Wise out of a photo array but requested a personal confrontation to
confirm her suspicions. The court noted that the lineup, while a more
severe seizure than the momentary stop in Terry, was still of lesser
magnitude than a formal arrest. For this reason, the court permitted
the procedure to be tested for its reasonableness. In doing so, the
court determined that the public interest in apprehending the rapist
justified the procedure even in the absence of probable cause.73
65. The forced production of nontestimonial evidence has been held not to violate the
suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. See supra note 3. This observation, however, does
not consider the overall intrusiveness of the detention which is the central fourth amendment
inquiry.
66. Alaska and North Carolina also require that the evidence sought be of material aid
in solving the crime. The restriction seeks to limit the issuance of orders to cases in which the
law enforcement need is great. The effectiveness of the safeguard, however, will depend on how
judges define the vague term "materially aid."
67. For a discussion of the warrant requirement, see supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
The decisions upholding the validity of state provisions have been criticized. See In re Abe
A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 437 N.E.2d 265, 269, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 10 (1982) ("li)t is hard to
regard such holdings as constitutionally firm."), In re Armed Robbery, 99 Wash. 2d 106, i1 -
12, 659 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1983).
68. See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 69 Mich. App. 288, 244 N.W.2d 451 (1976) (no
jurisdiction unless provided by statute or court rule); Alphonso C. v. Morgenthau, 50 A.D.2d
97, 376 N.Y.S.2d 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (general jurisdiction does not provide authority
to order detention unless upon probable cause); In re Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265,
452 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1982) (absent express provision, no waiver to issue warrant unless satisfy
search warrant requirement of probable cause).
69. See, e.g., State v. Schweitzer, 183 N.J. Super. 228, 443 A.2d 767 (App. Div.
1981).
70. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 93 N.J. 552, 461 A.2d 1155 (1983).
71. See, e.g., Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. Id. -
73. The court, however, expressed
[g]rave reservations ...as to whether this type of court-ordered lineup, not
The New Jersey Supreme Court followed the Wise decision in
State v. Hall.74 In that case, the court reasoned that Davis man-
dated three conditions before a departure from probable cause could
be made: 1) detention must not significantly intrude upon individual
privacy and freedom; 2) procedures must lead to production of relia-
ble evidence; 3) procedures must be administered without abuse, co-
ercion, or intimidation. Regulated by special safeguards, the court
announced,75 the lineup met these conditions.76
A few courts have found certain procedure to be unconstitu-
tional without a showing of probable cause. In In Re Multi-Vehicle
Accident,7 the court refused to issue an order for the photographing
of a man who was suspected of leaving the scene of an accident.
Though the court applied a reasonableness standard, it ruled on the
merits that the underlying offense was not sufficiently serious to war-
rant a three-hour detention for photographing. 78 The Washington
Supreme Court flatly rejected the balancing approach in In Re
Armed Robbery.79 In that case the supreme court refused to order
participation in a lineup without probable cause, emphasizing that
probable cause was required in the great majority of fourth amend-
ment cases. Although the court acknowledged that Terry represented
an exception to the requirement, it maintained that the exception
was to be construed narrowly and was unwilling to extend Terry to
what it believed to be the substantially intrusive act of a compelled
connected with a formal arrest, may be used constitutionally in other than seri-
ous felonies involving grave personal injuries or threats of the same. The govern-
ment interest, though serious, is not of the same magnitude in commercial
crimes involving property or money such as forgery or false pretenses or other
less serious offenses.
Id. at 216.
74. 93 N.J. 552, 461 A.2d 1155 (1983).
75. The court promulgated four standards to be met before an order would issue: I)
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a crime has been committed and was under active in-
vestigation; 2) a reasonable and well founded basis to believe the individual committed the
offense; 3) results of the procedures must significantly advance the investigation; and 4) evi-
dence must be obtainable otherwise. The court required procedural safeguards in addition. For
example, the suspect was to be afforded the right to counsel during the procedures, and the
procedures if possible were to be conducted at a time convenient for the suspect.
The court noted that the legislature was the appropriate body to deal with the complex
subject matter but held that the standards and safeguards which it promulaated sufficiently
minimized the intrusion to pass constitutional muster.
76. The court concluded that the lineup met the Davis requirements but added that
there were some identification procedures that might not meet the Davis standards. Id. at 563,
461 A.2d at 1161.
Also upholding identification procedures on less than probable cause was In re Finger-
printing of M.B., 125 N.J. Super. 115, 309 A.2d 3 (App. Div. 1973) (fingerprinting of all
members of 8th grade class permitted under order containing several safeguards).
77. 135 N.J. Super. 190, 342 A.2d 903 (1975).
78. The court noted that the cases in which identification orders have been allowed
generally have involved murder, sexual abuse or other serious crime. Id. at 195, 342 A.2d at
906. But see Long v. Garrett, 22 Ariz. App. 397, 527 P.2d 1240 (1974) (order approved for
handwriting sample in investigation of stolen check worth $157).
79. 99 Wash. 2d 106, 659 P.2d 1092 (1983).
lineup."0
IV. The Constitutional Question in Light of Recent Supreme
Court Decisions
A. Predicting the Supreme Court's Approach: Per Se Rule or Bal-
ancing Test?
Perhaps more so than most areas of the law, attempting to com-
prehend the fourth amendment cases is rather like stepping
through the looking glass with Alice. Precedents and analytical
approaches appear and disappear like the Cheshire Cat."
This subsection identifies the criteria by which the current Su-
preme Court would probably judge the constitutionality of identifica-
tion procedures on less than probable cause if faced with the proper
case. To understand the views of the present court, it is first neces-
sary to examine how various interpretations of the fourth amend-
ment have shaped the body of precedent. The words of the amend-
ment are an appropriate place to begin.
The fourth amendment sets forth its protections in two conjunc-
tive clauses. The first provides that, "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures shall not be violated" (reasonableness
clause). The second clause continues, "and no Warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized" (warrant clause).82 The amendment does not
proscribe all state intrusions - only those that are unreasonable.83
Therefore, propriety of police conduct depends on its reasonableness.
Unfortunately, "unreasonable" is not defined. Moreover, the struc-
ture of the amendment leaves uncertain what role the warrant clause
should play in determining reasonableness. 4 This ambiguity has led
80. The court relied heavily upon Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Ac-
cord, United States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d 11I (9th Cir. 1972) (Terry, on-the-spot detention
should not be extended to cover forced trip to police station, fingerprinting, photographing, and
completion of lengthy arrest report).
81. Bacigal, supra note 19, at 763.
82. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
83. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1924).
84. See Stelzer, The Fourth Amendment: The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses,
10 N.M.L. REV. 33 (1979-1980), 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 3.1, at 439. This fault has
been criticized. See J. TANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43
(1969); Devlin, The Police in a Changing Society, 57 J. CRIM. LAW CRIM. POL SCI. 123, 128
(1966).
Uncertainty caused by the structure of the amendment may be in large part due to de-
fects in the drafting process. The amendment as originally introduced by James Madison read
as follows:
The right of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers,
to two competing theories of the proper criteria for judging
reasonableness.
The first position emphasizes the link between the reasonable-
ness clause and warrant clause. Under this view, police action that
does not comply with the provisions of the second clause is precisely
what the first clause proscribes as "unreasonable." Therefore, all
search and seizures that are not supported by a warrant based on
probable cause and appropriately specified are unreasonable and so
impermissible.85
The second position regards the two parts of the amendment as
separate and independent protections. Under this theory, while the
warrant clause serves to establish the standards for a valid warrant,
the presence or absence of a warrant is not conclusive as to reasona-
bleness. Thus, the general prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures in the first clause is overarching. This analysis requires that
the question of reasonableness be judged not by the mechanical test
of whether the police obtained a warrant, but by all the facts and
circumstances of each case, hence, a balancing.86
Debate over the proper interpretation has brought inconsistency
and complexity to the Supreme Court's decisions. 87 In the earliest
and their property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or
things to be seized.
Thus in the amendment's original form, the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
was directly linked to the requirement of warrant based on probable cause. Dissatisfied with
the language "by warrants issued" Representative Benson suggested the stronger phrase "and
no warrant shall issue." His proposal was defeated by a sizeable majority. Yet, as chairman of
the committee charged with reporting the House version, Benson simply reported to the Senate
his own formulation. It was this language that was subsequently approved by the Senate and
then ratified by the states. Hence the present confusion caused by the conjunctive form. See
Stelzer, supra note 84; 3 W. LAFAVE supra note 11.
85. This approach is based on a reading of the amendment in light of its historic origin.
The fourth amendment, like similar provisions adopted in the various state constitutions, was a
reaction to the oppressive writs of assistance, court orders used by the British to enforce cus-
tom regulations. The writs were in the form of a standing search warrant; they authorized the
inspection of any house at any time upon the officer's discretion, without any particular suspi-
cion that the person had committed a violation. Because the fourth amendment and specific
safeguards of the warrant clause sought to prevent this practice, some have concluded that
only those search and seizures which conform to the requirements of the warrant clause are
acceptable. See Stelzer, supra note 84.
86. The advocates of this view maintain that the framers did not intend the warrant
clause to be the exclusive definition of a reasonable search or seizure. They point out that
certain police intrusions at the time of the amendment's adoption had been assumed to be
permissible even though unsupported by a warrant (e.g., a search incident to a lawful arrest).
In their view, since constitution itself provides no ready test for determining reasonableness,
the question must be resolved in a common sense, case-by-case method.
87. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (majority opinion ap-
plying general reasonableness approach) overruled in Chimmel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) with Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (provisions of warrant clause crucial
in determining reasonableness).
Some members of the Court have espoused the view that the reasonableness clause places
limits on the government's power in addition to those of the warrant clause. Under this theory
cases to interpret the amendment, the Court stressed the provisions'
historic origins. In Boyd v. United States,88 the Court reasoned that
since the framers spoke of unreasonable searches and seizures with
the oppressive writs of assistance in mind,89 the provisions of the
warrant clause which specifically guarded against those practices
should play a crucial role in determining reasonableness. Thus, in In
Re Jackson,9 the Court assumed that the fourth amendment re-
quired the police to have a warrant before they seized a sealed pack-
age from the mail. The rationale of these cases slowly evolved91 into
a general rule that searches and seizures that were not conducted
pursuant to a warrant 92 and based on probable cause were unconsti-
tutional per se.93 While the Court did excuse the failure to obtain
advance judicial approval in a limited number of emergency situa-
tions,94 these departures were viewed as historic exceptions to the per
se rule. In no case was the Court willing to lift the requirement of
probable cause.95 For example, in Carroll v. United States,96 the
Court stated: "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasona-
bly practicable it must be used. . . . In cases where seizure is impos-
sible except without a warrant the seizing officer acts unlawfully and
at his peril unless he can show the Court probable cause.
' 97
The per se rule provided a strict standard for full searches and
seizures. But a question arose whether it was the appropriate stan-
dard by which to judge all police activity. Techniques such as brief
on-the-street stops of persons were substantially less intrusive than
an arrest and were important law enforcement tools. Yet the investi-
gatory nature of these procedures was antithetical to a showing or
probable cause.98 A court operating under the per se rule was forced
the warrant clause imposes procedural restrictions and the reasonable clause is an additional
substantive check. See, e.g., Andressen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 493 (1976) (Brennan, J,,
dissenting); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See gener-
ally, Bacigal, supra note 19, at 764 n.6.
88. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
89. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
90. 96 U.S. 127 (1877).
91. Most of the fourth amendment precedent did not develop until about 1920. See
Bacigal, supra note 19, at 767, n.22.
92. The purposes of the warrant requirement was stated by Justice Douglas in McDon-
ald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948): "The presence of a search warrant serves a
high function. . . . [l]t interpose[s] a magistrate between the citizen and the police. . . . [The
warrant requirement] was done so that an objective mind might weight the need to invade that
privacy in order to enforce the law."
93. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). This view was not at all times
shared by all members of the Court. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 392 U.S. 56 (1950),
overruled in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
94. See, e.g., Chimmel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident valid
arrest).
95. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
96. 267 U.S. 132 (1927).
97. Id. at 156.
98. The court would not hold brief on-the-street stops invalid for lack of a judicial
either to declare the practices unconstitutional or hold that they did
not constitute searches and seizures within the fourth amendment's
protection. 9 Dissatisfaction with this all-or-nothing choice led the
Supreme Court to introduce modifications in Camara v. Municipal
Court'00 and Terry v. Ohio.1"'
In Camara the issue was the constitutionality of area-wide
housing inspections that were designed to enforce local health and
safety regulations. 102 As discussed above, the searches were con-
ducted in every house, regardless whether authorities had evidence of
a specific violation - a procedure that local officials argued was nec-
essary because violations were not detectable from the outside. In
keeping with precedent, the Court held that the searches were per-
missible only if supported by a warrant and probable cause. 1 But
the Court avoided the rigidity of the per se rule by remodeling the
concept of probable cause. Rather than taking the standard to mean
a reasonable belief that a violation had been committed, the Court
defined probable cause as the standard of suspicion that reasonably
justified the official procedure in light of the public's interest and
offensiveness of the practice.104 In other words, so long as the degree
of suspicion was reasonable-whatever its strength-toward a par-
ticular person, the Court would consider it probable cause. Applying
this standard, the Court held that area-wide searches conducted pur-
suant to a legislative or administrative scheme were reasonable re-
gardless of whether there was particularized probable cause. 10 5 Thus,
while the Supreme Court intimated that the requirement of a war-
rant supported by probable cause still controlled, it had in Camara
altered the concept of probable cause, for the first time relaxing the
determination of probable cause to reasonableness under circum-
stances unrelated to the particular subject of the search.106
warrant. Rather, this necessarily swift action would fit under the exigent circumstances excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
99. Compare Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) with Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959).
100. Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
101. Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
102. For the text of the municipal ordinance authorizing the searches see supra note 21.
For a detailed discussion of the constitutionality of administrative inspections see 3 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 10.1-§ 10.4.
103. The Court's ruling that a warrant was necessary directly overruled its prior holding
in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Prior to Camara, the Frank ruling was generally
interpreted as an exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches. See
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387, U.S. 523, 529 (1967).
104. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-535.
105. Id. at 538. The court in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), a companion
case to Camara, applied identical reasoning to hold that administrative searches of business
premises were permissible without probable cause to believe a specific code violation existed.
106. Justice White's remodeling of the probable cause requirement was unprecedented.
Justice Clark dissented from the Camara decision, remarking "[The Court's] newfangled war-
rant system is entirely foreign to fourth amendment standards." Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387
In Terry, an experienced police officer had stopped a man whom
he believed to be armed and about to commit a robbery. When the
man answered the officer's questions inaudibly, the officer briefly
frisked the man's outer clothing. The frisk produced a revolver.
Terry challenged the validity of the search, arguing that the officers
did not have probable cause. The state countered, contending that an
officer must be given the authority to protect himself without having
to satisfy a rigid probable cause requirement before acting."'
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the frisk despite the ab-
sence of probable cause. Reasoning that this conduct "historically
had not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to
the warrant procedure,' 0 8 the Court held the additional Warrant
Clause requirement of probable cause inapplicable. Instead, the
court tested the conduct only under the fourth amendment's general
proscription against "unreasonable searches and seizures" '  and
concluded that the officer was justified in making the frisk upon his
reasonable belief that the suspect was armed and dangerous regard-
less of the existence of probable cause." 0
By holding that some police conduct might be supported by sus-
picion less than traditional probable cause, Camara and Terry threw
the validity of the per se rule into question. While there is broad
language in each opinion reinforcing this change,"' the Court care-
U.S. 523, 547 (Clark dissenting). Generally, other members of the court have not adopted his
approach. But see Almeida-Sanches v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Apparently Justice White's primary concern was guaranteeing that the inspections were
made pursuant to some type of judicial authorization. His indirect submerging of the probable
cause requirement may have been out of concern of violating the fourth amendment command
that "no warrant shall issue but on probable cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Perhaps for the
same reason, all the state schemes are denominated "orders" for identification procedures
rather than warrants.
107. The state also argued that the frisk was not prohibited by the fourth amendment
because it did not rise to the level of a full search. The Court sternly rejected this argument,
and holding that the action was subject to fourth amendment scrutiny. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
108. Id. at 20.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 30.
The Court's holding that a police officer may act on less suspicion when acting without a
warrant precisely because he is so acting without a warrant suggests that a police officer pos-
sesses more power when acting upon his own initiative than he would when acting under judi-
cial warrant. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Terry 392 U.S. at 36 (Douglas, J., dissenting), was
correct in pointing out that the Court's prior holdings were consistently to the contrary. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 in which the Court stated, "Whether or not the
requirements of reliability and particularly of information on which an officer may act are
more stringent where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent, than
where an arrest warrant is obtained." The Terry decision is usually cited for its holding that
the reasonableness clause is applicable, with the Court's underlying process left unmentioned.
See, e.g., Wise v. Murphy, 270 A.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Indeed if the Court's underlying
process were strictly applied, Terry would not support identification procedures on less than
probable cause at all because they are subject to the warrant requirement.
111. In Camara the concept of "variable probable cause" was said to apply whenever a
warrant was required. 387 U.S. at 534. And in Terry, the Court intimated that a reasonable-
ness test was to be applied whenever a warrant was not required. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
fully crafted its holdings in narrow terms in both the Camara and
Terry decisions." 2
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the precedent it had
laid in Camara and Terry narrowly. For instance, in Sibron v. New
York," 3 a companion case to Terry, the Court ruled that a search of
a suspected narcotics carrier was invalid. As in Terry, the search
was very limited, but the Court ruled that since the officer did not
act out of self protection, the search did not fit within the Terry
exception and therefore had to be based on probable cause."' In Al-
meidaSanchez v. United States,"5 the Court held that the search of
an auto for illegal aliens had to be based on probable cause, rejecting
the government's argument that because of heightened public inter-
est in policing the border, the practice should be judged by
reasonableness. a1 6
In a second line of decisions, the Court appeared to change its
position and to begin applying the reasonableness test liberally. For
example, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,"7 the Court held that
roving border patrols could stop automobiles upon a reasonable sus-
picion that they contained illegal aliens. And in Delaware v.
Prouse,"8 the Court recognized the power of the police to order a
driver of a vehicle stopped for another lawful purpose to step out of
the vehicle even though there was no reason to believe that the par-
ticular person was armed. In these cases the Court apparently em-
ployed the Terry balancing test without regard to whether the gov-
ernment interest or the nature of the intrusion approximated that in
Terry."
19
In 1979 the Court changed direction once again with its deci-
sion in Dunaway v. New York. 20 In that case, police had seized a
112. Justice White noted in Camara that the approach utilized by the Court "neither
endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of
the probable cause requirement in this area." Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. In Terry, the Court
explained, "Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to canvass in detail the
constitutional limitations upon the scope of a policeman's power when he confronts a citizen
without probable cause to arrest him." Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
113. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
114. Id. at 65.
115. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
116. Id. at 273. Justice Stewart, writing the opinion for the Court, stated, "The needs of
law enforcement stand in constant tension with the constitution's protection of the individual
against certain exercises of official power." Id.
Two additional cases in which the Court interpreted Terry narrowly are Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291 (1973) (scraping of fingernails requires probable cause despite less intrusiveness
than full search) and Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (detention for fingerprints and
questioning requires probable cause).
117. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
118. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
119. The Court's willingness to apply a balancing test during this period is dramatically
demonstrated by United States v. Crtiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) in which the Court applied such
an approach even though the police conduct was a full search of a stopped automobile.
120. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
murder suspect and transported him to the police station where he
was subjected to a lengthy interrogation. In review, the Court held
that the police conduct was unconstitutional because it was not
based on probable cause. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan em-
phasized the historic importance of the probable cause requirement.
The Court interpreted Terry to be only a narrow exception to the
rule requiring probable cause. Moreover, the court explained, the
Terry balancing test was to be applied only when the conduct was
substantially less intrusive than a full arrest; in all other cases, prob-
able cause would be required.121
The Supreme Court's failure to take a consistent position has
continued in its most recent decisions. Two distinct approaches un-
derlie two 1983 cases on the subject of search and seizure. In United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 2 the Court was called to pass on
the constitutionality of a federal statute 23 which authorized custom
officers to board any ship at any time to examine documents and
papers. Authorities had randomly boarded Villamonte-Marquez's
vessel and uncovered a large quantity of marijuana. Without discuss-
ing whether the Terry precedent was applicable, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, applied a reasonableness test. The Court
ruled that the stops could be made without any suspicion that a par-
ticular boat was violating the law. 124 In United States v. Place,
25
airport authorities stopped a man whom they believed to be carrying
narcotics. As their suspicions deepened, the authorities seized the
man's luggage and, ninety minutes later, at a different location, sub-
mitted it to a narcotics dog sniff test. On review, the Supreme Court
held that under other circumstances the detention of luggage might
be permissible on less than probable cause, but "it is clear that the
police conduct here exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type
investigative stop.'
' 26
Under the first approach, employed in Villamonte-Marquez, the
Court assumed the Terry balancing test to be applicable in all cases
in which the police intrusion did not amount to a full search or
seizure. In the second approach, applied in Place, the Court initially
determined whether the police practice was within the Terry excep-
tion. Only in this instance would the balancing test be applicable. If
the Court found the practice to be outside the Terry exception, prob-
able cause would be the standard. The second approach contem-
plates that at least some lesser intrusions are unconstitutional per se
121. Id. at 209-13.
122. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
123. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976).
124. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
125. 103 S. Ct. 2637.
126. Id. at 2645.
when not supported by probable cause. However, even under this ap-
proach the court apparently engages in some sort of balancing.
Moreover, the Terry rationale has been expanded to include a vari-
ety of conduct of the police and of the government not contemplated
in the Terry opinion; therefore, the boundaries of this exception are
not clear.' 27 The determination of whether any specific practice falls
within the Terry exception is actually another way of stating the
Court's conclusion on whether the conduct is reasonable on grounds
less than probable cause. Those practices thought to be reasonable
are declared to be within the exception, those thought not reasonable
are declared to be outside the exception.
Thus, identification procedures on less than probable cause will
not simply be declared invalid because they violate the per se rule.
The Court will judge the procedures by their reasonableness, either
by an acknowledged balancing test under the first approach or a si-
lent balancing test under the second approach.
B. The Reasonableness of Identification Procedures on Less than
Probable Cause
1. Explanation of the Test. - Under a reasonable test, a
court will evaluate all the facts and circumstances of the case.'28 The
factors can be grouped into three considerations: 1) the intrusiveness
of the police conduct from the individual's point of view; 2) the im-
portance of the public interest supporting the police practice; and 3)
the strength of the evidence which links the suspect with the com-
mission of the crime. Courts often speak of the procedure of evaluat-
ing these competing factors as a balancing process.'29 They place the
offensiveness of the investigative conduct on one side of the scale and
the public interest in the procedure on the opposite side. Then they
add the weight of the evidence to the public interest side. If this
combination outweighs the individual interest, courts will allow the
conduct. Courts will forbid the practice if the opposite is true. The
procedure requires that courts assign some relative weight to the
government interest and to the severity of the personal intrusion.'30
Ranking the factors is necessarily both difficult and subjective. For
instance, what is more intrusive, a brief patdown for weapons or be-
127. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
129. The concept of a balancing test was first introduced in Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
130. ' Under a per se rule, no ranking of the government interest is required. Probable
cause is the standard applied regardless of differentials in the police need or intrusiveness of
the procedure. The difficulty of assigning a relative weight to these variables has led some
courts and commentators to conclude that the balancing test should only be applied when
absolutely required. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
ing taken into custody to participate in a lineup? Which is a more
compelling public interest, detection of illegal aliens or the control of
international drug smuggling? In addition, courts must make an
equally subjective comparison of the private interest to the public
interest.13 1 Since a court's decision is largely based on value judg-
ments, the outcome of balancing is difficult to predict. If it is availa-
ble, precedent is the best guide.
2. The Test as Applied by the Supreme Court. - The follow-
ing chart lists the Camara and Terry decisions along with sixteen
subsequent Supreme Court cases in which the Court examined the




Terry v. Ohio (1968)3'
Pa. v. Mimms (1977) 1 "8
Health and Safety Standards
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inspection of residence
search of auto (roving patrol)
search of auto (fixed chk. pt.)
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taking into custody and lengthy
questioning
131. The difficulty of applying a balancing test is heightened when a police officer must
make the decision in the heat of a criminal investigation.
132. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
133. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
134. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
135. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
136. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
137. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
138. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
139. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
140. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
141. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).















PUBLIC INTEREST POLICE PRACTICE REQUIRED
(cont'd) (cont'd) (cont'd)
Davis v. Mississippi (1969)14 taking into custody, brief questioning P/C
& fingerprinting
Fla. v. Royer (1983)1 "  taking to airport security office & P/C
brief questioning
U.S. v. Place (1983)41 90 min. detention of luggage P/C
Mich. v. Summers (1981)146 detention during execution of search L/PC*
warrant
Del. v. Prouse (1979)14 stop of auto (roving patrol) L/PC
U.S. v. Villamonte- stop and boarding boat (roving patrol) L/PC*
Marquez (1983)1"8
Adams v. Williams (1972) 119  stop on the street for questioning L/PC
The name of the decisions appears with the particular police practice
employed and the level of suspicion required by the Court.' 50 The
cases are grouped according to the public interest implicated under
their facts. By organizing the cases in this manner, the nature of the
public interest is controlled for, making comparison along the line of
the challenged practice meaningful. Of course, this scheme fails to
take into account the severity of the crime. Further refinements may
not be crucial, however, because outside the interests of officer safety
and enforcement of municipal code; the Court has focused primarily
on the intrusiveness of the police conduct. 151
The subject of this comment, identification procedures used in
criminal investigations, would fall under the last listed category. The
cases in this category demonstrate that the Court has drawn a line
between conduct it regards as so intrusive that probable cause is re-
quired and conduct it thinks less intrusive justifying a lesser stan-
dard. The Court has not definitively answered the crucial question on
which side of the line identification procedures fall. State schemes
assume that all identification orders issued according to their terms
fall on the less-than-probable-cause side of the line." 2 Courts that
have authorized detentions for lineups, fingerprinting, handwriting,
photographing, hair samples, and blood samples uniformly have
143. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
144. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
145. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
146. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
147. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
148. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
149. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
150. "P/C" indicates probable cause, "LP/C" indicates less than probable cause. In
cases where an "*' appears, the Court held that particularized suspicion was not required to
support the action.
151. For an example of how public interest has proved decisive when officer safety was
involved, compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I with Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
152. For a description of these schemes see supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
placed those procedures on the less-than-probable-cause side of the
line.
153
But the state schemes approving forced identification on less
than probable cause may have misperceived the likely direction of
the Supreme Court. For although the Court has not categorized
identification procedures one way or the other, it has been consist-
ently sensitive to the degree of intrusiveness that can be said to be
characteristic of forced identification procedures. Taking physical ev-
idence involves two phases of state action. The first is compelling the
person to appear at the place where the authorities will carry out the
procedure. Requiring a person to be present at a designated time and
place is a significant interference with that person's liberty and
under certain circumstances may be extremely inconvenient or even
costly. 154 Compelled appearance is substantially different from a
brief detainment of the individual at the place where he is found -
significantly, the only police practice the Supreme Court has upheld
without probable cause in the criminal investigation context. The
second phase of identification procedures is the extraction of the
evidence.
In determining that fingerprinting was a relatively unobtrusive
procedure, the Court in Davis pointed out that "[fingerprinting] in-
volves none of the probing into an individual's private life and
thoughts that mark an interrogation or search."' 155 Consistent with
this statement, the Supreme Court has not approved any type of
search on less than probable cause when the government interest is
merely the investigation of a crime.' 56 Certainly, this position casts
doubt on the constitutionality of identification procedures based on
less than probable cause that rise to the level of full "searches."',5
Both the taking of blood and scraping of fingernails specifically have
been held to be searches that require probable cause'58 and is no
reason why a lesser level of suspicion should suffice simply because
the taking blood or scraping of nails is done pursuant to a judicial
order' 59 under a state scheme.' Even if the procedure is not held to
153. For a discussion of these cases see supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
154. For example a suspect may be required to miss time at work or be unable to par-
ticipate in a planned activity.
155. Davis, 394 U.S. at 727 (1969).
156. But see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 9.6, at 161-62 (procedures which constitute
limited searches should be permitted).
157. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85
(1979). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968), the Court permitted a brief frisk for weapons on
less than probable cause, but only in cases in which the officer's safety was at stake. In
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court allowed a full search of a per-
son's residence without a showing or probable cause. The Court in Camara, however expressly
distinguished searches in the criminal context.
158. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
159. For an application of the Katz text see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I
be a search in itself (which most would not under the Katz v. United
States'6' expectation of privacy test) what the authorities would
have the suspect do still must be taken into account in evaluating the
total intrusiveness of the procedure.
A second aspect the Supreme Court would consider in reviewing
an identification procedure based on less than probable cause, is the
location where the police confront the suspect. Outside of the health
and safety inspection allowed in Camara, the Court has only been
willing to depart from the probable cause standard when the police
practice grows out of a spontaneous on-the-scene contact with the
suspect. In contrast, identification procedures usually contemplate a
forced visit to the police station. The difference is a heightened possi-
bility that some sort of social stigma will attach to the procedures -
a factor that correspondingly enhances the overall intrusiveness of
the procedures. 162 For example, in Michigan v. Summers,6 ' the
Court upheld the forced detention of an individual while his home
was being searched pursuant to a warrant. The Court explained that
one of the reasons why the police practice was sufficiently slight to
justify a departure from probable cause was the fact that detention
occurred where the police found the detainee.
A third consideration for the Court would be the amount of
time required to complete the procedures. Beyond Michigan v. Sum-
mers, in which the Court did not mention the time element, the
Court has allowed only brief detention for questioning on less than
probable cause. In fact, the Court highlighted the importance of
brevity in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,6 5 in which it stated:
"The officer may question the driver and passengers about their citi-
zenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain
suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must
be based on consent or probable cause."' 6  In United States v.
Place, '7 the Court held that a ninety minute detention of luggage
required probable cause based upon the duration of the detention
(1973).
160. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (scraping of fingernails); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (taking of blood samples).
161. For this reason, the UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 436 does not authorize the taking of blood
or urine samples. See supra note 52, but see state schemes, discussed supra notes 41-50 and
accompanying text. which all provide for the taking of blood.
162. Social stigma may be reduced when the suspect is allowed to appear at the station
on his own initiative rather than by police escort. Some state schemes allow for this possibility.
See supra note 45. See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. (1973). This option, however,
may not be available when there is reason to suspect that the suspect will flee or destroy the
evidence when served with the order.
163. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
164. Id.
165. 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975).
166. Id. at 881, 882.
167. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
alone. In contrast, many state schemes authorize detention for three,
four, and five hour periods; others place no limit on the amount of
time. 168 Given these pronouncements of the Supreme Court, identifi-
cation procedures that entail a lengthy detention at the police station
appear constitutionally suspect at the least.
Precisely which procedures the Court would approve and under
what circumstances, of course, is difficult to determine. This predic-
tion is made particularly difficult because the Court has provided
little guidance in the area and because, by its very nature, an evalua-
tion of intrusiveness is always a subjective determination. At least it
is clear that the less intrusive the practice, the greater its chance of
validity. Courts sensitized to the foreseeable misgivings of the Su-
preme Court can impose suitable restrictions on the identification
procedures. Additional safeguards such as keeping the proceeding
private, providing counsel, and destruction of negative evidence may
further minimize the intrusion without lessening the usefulness of
the practice.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to consider
the justification for and slightness of police conduct in fourth amend-
ment search-and-seizure cases and has in some cases loosened the
requirement of probable cause. Davis v. Mississippi suggests that a
similar analysis may be applicable to forced identification procedures
on evidence which amounts to less than probable cause. The Davis
dictum, however, should not be read as a broad grant of authority to
dispose of the probable cause requirement whenever the police seek
an identification procedure. The Supreme Court has only been will-
ing to allow a lesser standard when the police conduct was substan-
tially less intrusive than a full search or arrest. Several aspects of
identification procedures appear to be more intrusive than any crimi-
nal investigatory technique thus far allowed on less than probable
cause.
Because comparison of physical evidence is a particularly effec-
tive law enforcement tool, the Supreme Court may be persuaded to
tolerate a greater intrusion. In the absence of specific Supreme
Court guidance, however, courts and legislatures probably should err
on the side of individual rights and closely scrutinize the intrusive-
ness of the particular proceeding. In particular, courts should ex-
amine the amount of time contemplated by the procedure, the nature
of the procedure, and the possibility of social stigma attaching to the
subject of the procedure. Any additional safeguards that would fur-
168. See supra notes 42-46.
ther minimize the intrusion should be applied. Only under such re-
strictions are compelled identification procedures likely to fall within
the "narrowly defined circumstances" contemplated by Davis.
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